Thus, from the beginning, we have had in this country two essentially separate legal systems. Considered in this light, we cannot agree with the dissenting view in this case that the District Court in 1967 "by necessary implication" decided that the union had a federally protected right to picket that "could not be subverted by resort to state proceedings." Contributor Names Black, Hugo Lafayette … 70, 29 U.S.C. If the union was adversely affected by the state court's decision, it was free to seek vindiction of its federal right in the Florida appellate courts and ultimately, if necessary, in this Court. The prohibition of 28 U.S.C. In an attempt to clarify the basis of this argument, the District Judge asked: "You are basing your case solely on the Norris-LaGuardia Act?" 28 U.S.C. In Capital Service, the NLRB sought an injunction against certain picketing under § 10(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. App. The Hutcheson case held that protected union activity would not be deemed violative of federal antitrust law. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the granting of injunctive relief on the ground that this action was within the § 2283 exception relating to the effectuation of federal court judgments. It is hardly surprising that BLE emphasized the Jacksonville Terminal decision in the state proceedings to dissolve the state injunction, and this reliance is hardly inconsistent with the position that the federal court in 1917 had authoritatively delineated BLE's federally protected right to strike at the Moncrief Yard. See Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., ___ U.S. ___, 22 L. Ed. Thus from the beginning we have had in this country two essentially separate legal systems. Post, at 299. Today that amended statute provides: 'A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.' 699, 98 L.Ed. At no point did the union appear to argue that the federal court had already determined that the railroad was precluded from obtaining an injunction under Florida law. The union's lawyer replied: "Right. Furthermore, both in support of the motion for a preliminary injunction and during oral argument in the District Court, BLE relied extensively upon Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, and United Indus. The respondents here have intimated that the Act only establishes a "principle of comity," not a binding rule on the power of the federal courts. Moreover, no matter how the arguments of counsel before the District Court are understood, it is apparent that the District Judge did not bottom the 1969 injunction upon our intervening decision in Jacksonville Terminal but merely cited that case to support the court's 1967 conclusion that the picketing in question constituted federally protected activity whether or not it had 'secondary' aspects. Meanwhile the employer obtained from a state court an injunction against any picketing on or near its premises. Although the federal court did have jurisdiction of the railroad's complaint based on federal law, the state court also had jurisdiction over the complaint based on state law and the union's asserted federal defense, as well. Some of these limits were spelled out in the 1789 Act. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 396 U.S. 1201 (1969) Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. The argument implies that in certain circumstances a federal court may enjoin state court proceedings even if that action cannot be justified by any of the three exceptions. Argued March 2-3, 1970. Pp. § 101 et seq., against issuance by federal courts of injunctions in labor disputes. and S. S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees, AFL-CIO v. Florida East Coast Ry. The union argued that it was a party to a labor dispute with the FEC, that it had exhausted the administrative remedies required by the Railway Labor Act, and that it was thus free to engage in 'self-help,' or concerted economic activity. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals sustaining the District Court's grant of injunctive relief against petitioner's giving effect to, or availing itself of, the benefit of the state court injunction. Similarly if, because of the Florida Circuit Court's action, the union faced the threat of immediate irreparable injury sufficient to justify an injunction under usual equitable principles, it was undoubtedly free to seek such relief from the Florida appellate courts, and might possibly in certain emergency circumstances seek such relief from this Court as well. It is settled that the prohibition of § 2283 cannot be evaded by addressing the order to the parties or prohibiting utilization of the results of a completed state proceeding. Again the argument is somewhat unclear, but it appears to go in this way: the District Court had acquired jurisdiction over the labor controversy in 1967, when the railroad filed its complaint, and it determined at that time that it did have jurisdiction. Act of March 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. The next day, the District Court entered an order denying the requested restraining order. ... "Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers." Fast and free shipping free returns cash on delivery available on eligible purchase. Unlike the Federal District Court, this Court does have potential appellate jurisdiction over federal questions raised in state court proceedings, and that broader jurisdiction allows this Court correspondingly broader authority to issue injunctions "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction.". Encontre diversos livros escritos por WELDON, JOHN W, MILLEDGE, ALLAN, Additional Contributors … Thus, in order to make the dual system work and 'to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts,' Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9, 60 S.Ct. Both sides agree that, although this federal injunction is, in terms, directed only at the railroad, it is an injunction "to stay proceedings in a State court." Rather, the union appears to have argued that the decision of this Court in Jacksonville Terminal operated to define the scope of the right to self-help which the District Court had found the union entitled to exercise, and that the state court injunction interfered with that right as so defined. But those powers that were not surrendered were retained by the States and unless a State was restrained by "the supreme Law of the Land" as expressed in the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, it was free to exercise those retained powers as it saw fit. resort to state proceedings not be permitted to undermine a prior judgment of a federal court. (b) The District Court's determination in 1967 that the union had a right to "engage in self-help" under federal law, was not a decision that federal law precluded an injunction based on state law. Again, lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions. Although the record on this point is not unambiguously clear, we conclude that no such interpretation of the 1967 order can be supported. Retrouvez Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. V. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings et des millions de livres en stock sur Amazon.fr. Mr. Justice MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. We know, from the (Jacksonville Terminal) decision * * *.' See the historical discussion of the origin of the 1793 statute in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. This interpretation of the order is supported by the fact that the District Judge relied upon Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U. S. 284 (1963), in which this Court held that the parties had exhausted all available procedures under the Railway Labor Act and thus were free to resort to self-help. 477. Only the Supreme Court was authorized to review on direct appeal the decisions of state courts. The respondent union does contend that the injunction was proper either as a means to protect or effectuate the District Court's 1967 order or in aid of that court's jurisdiction. 9, 24 L.Ed.2d 23 (1969). Natural Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Thus, in moving for a preliminary injunction against the state court proceedings, BLE relied both upon Jacksonville Terminal and upon the power of the District Court to issue the injunction 'to protect and effectuate the judgment of this Court dated April 26, 1967.' Neither party claims that Congress has authorized the federal court injunction. In the first place, it should be noted that the argument of counsel is not always a sure guide to the interpretation of a subsequent judicial decree or opinion, because it not infrequently happens, in this Court as well as others, that a decision is based on premises not elaborated by counsel. 1965); Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 362 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. For purposes of this case only, we will assume, without deciding, that the Florida Circuit Court's decision was wrong in light of our decision in Jacksonville Terminal. Similarly, BLE argued below that resort to state equitable proceedings should not be permitted to undermine the District Court's prior determination that BLE had a right to picket at the Moncrief Yard. This Court decided that the District Court had authority to enjoin the state proceedings so that it would have 'unfettered power to decide for or against the union, and to write such decree as it deemed necessary in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.' Thus, if the injunction against the Florida court, proceedings is to be upheld, it must be "expressly authorized by Act of Congress," "necessary in aid of [the District Court's] jurisdiction," or "to protect or effectuate [that court's] judgments.". The parties to the BLE-FEC 'major dispute,' having exhausted the procedures of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. This interpretation should be accepted as controlling, for certainly the District Judge is in the best position to render an authoritative interpretation of his own order. 1579, 12 L.Ed.2d 409 (1964). If the union was adversely affected by the state court's decision, it was free to seek vindication of its federal right in the Florida appellate courts, and ultimately, if necessary, in this Court. There is no present labor dispute between the ACL and the BLE or any other ACL employees. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers/Concurrence Harlan. This case is by no means an easy one. As part of its dispute with the Florida East Coast railroad (FEC) respondent Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) in 1967 began picketing a switching yard owned and operated by Atlantic Coast Line railroad (ACL). Litigants who foresaw the possibility of more favorable treatment in one or the other system would predictably hasten to invoke the powers of whichever court it was believed would present the best chance of success. Many of the Framers of the Constitution felt that separate federal courts were unnecessary and that the state courts could be entrusted to protect both state and federal rights. . '6. : 477 DECIDED BY: LOWER COURT: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit CITATION: 398 US 281 (1970) ARGUED: Mar 02, 1970 / Mar 03, 1970 DECIDED: Jun 08, 1970 Act of March 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. The crippling restrictions that the Court today places upon the power of the District Court to effectuate and protect its orders are totally inconsistent with both the plain language of § 2283 and the policies underlying that statutory provision. . . One 'supreme Court' was created by the Constitution, and Congress was given the power to create other federal courts. The union's lawyer replied: 'Right. While this language is admittedly broad, we conclude that it implies something similar to the concept of injunctions to 'protect or effectuate' judgments. This area often involves the doctrine of pre-emption, since Congress has regulated it so heavily that the state courts often lack authority to issue injunctions. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. 461, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964). As its injunction order indicates, the District Court was persuaded by BLE's argument. Docket no. No. In the course of deciding that request, the United States District Court determined that the union had a federally protected right to picket Moncrief Yard, and that this right could not be interfered with by state courts. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. V. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings. ), aff'd, 385 U.S. 20 (87 S.Ct. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers U.S. Supreme Court Transcript of Record with Supporting Pleadings [JOHN W WELDON, ALLAN MILLEDGE, Additional Contributors] on Amazon.com. 63. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 129 132, 62 S.Ct. The 1793 anti-injunction Act was, at least in part, a response to these pressures. Pp. When the federal judge denied the request, ACL immediately went into state court and there succeeded in obtaining an injunction. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner, v. BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS et al. The arguments in support of the union's contentions are not insubstantial. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. App. . The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET) is a labor union founded in Marshall, Michigan, on 8 May 1863 as the Brotherhood of the Footboard.It was the first permanent trade organization for railroad workers in the US. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner, v. BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS et al. § 52, are applicable to the conduct of the defendants here involved.". Furthermore, the District Court invoked § 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. [Footnote 4]". Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U. S. 511, 348 U. S. 515-516. ACL's application for a temporary injunction against the picketing, BLE contended that the District Court had previously held that, under controlling federal law, BLE's right to picket had been established, that this declaration of rights was res judicata in the state proceedings, and, consequently, that state proscription of the picketing was improper. 100 (1941). However, this policy of nonintervention is by no means absolute, as the explicit exceptions in § 2283 make entirely clear. § 101, and the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. 5th Cir. Understandably this dual court system was bound to lead to conflicts and frictions. In this situation, state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, and neither can prevent the parties from pursuing simultaneous claims in both courts. Thus, in moving for a preliminary injunction against the state court proceedings, BLE relied both upon Jacksonville Terminal and upon the power of the District Court to issue the injunction "to protect and effectuate the judgment of this Court dated April 26, 1967." 887) (1954); (United Indus. § 101, and the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. Supreme Court of United States. At no point did the union appear to argue that the federal court had already determined that the railroad was precluded from obtaining an injunction under Florida law. The lawyer then proceeded to argue that the Jacksonville Terminal case had clearly revealed that the right of self-help is beyond state court proscription in these circumstances. Now, Your Honor, at that point, did not get to the question of how broad is this right, because the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevented Your Honor from issuing an injunction. In essence, BLE argued that the 1967 order had correctly anticipated Jacksonville Terminal. 396 U.S. 901, 90 S.Ct. Third, no such situation is presented here. The District Judge's reliance upon Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 501 (1954), [Footnote 2/1] and United Indus. See ibid. (a) A federal injunction against state court proceedings otherwise proper under general equitable principles must be based on one of the specific statutory exceptions to § 2283. This brings us to the second prong of the union's argument, in which it is suggested that, even if the 1967 order did not determine the union's right to picket free from state interference, once the decision in Jacksonville Terminal was announced, the District Court was then free to enjoin the state court on the theory that such action was "necessary in aid of [the District Court's] jurisdiction." This interpretation of the order is supported by the fact that the District Judge relied upon Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U.S. 284, 83 S.Ct. Now, how broad, then, is that right? Buy the Paperback Book Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. V. Brotherhood Of Locomotive Engineers U.s. Supreme Court Transcri... by John W Weldon at Indigo.ca, Canada's largest bookstore. Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922); cf. 2 Record 104-105. At no point during the entire argument did either side refer to state law, the effects of that law on the picketing, or the possible preclusion of state remedies as a result of overriding federal law. 699, 98 L.Ed. Moreover, it is readily apparent from the District Court's 1969 order enjoining the state proceedings that the District Judge viewed his 1967 order as delineating the rights of the respective parties, and, more particularly, as establishing BLE's right to conduct the picketing in question under paramount federal law. R. Co. v. Railroad Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172 (C.A. Jacksonville Terminal, supra, at 394 U. S. 375-377, 394 U. S. 390. The 'economic self-interest' of the responding employees in refusing to handle this interchange and in making common cause with the striking FEC engineers is similarly present. Immediately after a petition for rehearing was denied in that case, 394 U.S. 1024 (1969), the respondent BLE filed a motion in state court to dissolve the Moncrief Yard injunction, arguing that, under the Jacksonville Terminal decision the injunction was improper. Thus, § 2283 itself evinces a congressional intent that resort to state proceedings not be permitted to undermine a prior judgment of a federal court. . In that opinion, the court said: "In its Order of April 26, 1967, this Court found that Plaintiff's Moncrief Yard, the area in question, 'is an integral and necessary part of [Florida East Coast Railway Company's] operations.' 887 (1954),1 and United Indus. I think at this point of the argument, since Norris-LaGuardia is clearly in point here.' Decided June 8, 1970. Each system proceeds independently of the other, with ultimate review in this Court of the federal questions raised in either system. P. 398 U. S. 296. 195—196. 63. When the union tried to dissolve the state court injunction, the argument was based entirely on the controlling effect of the Jacksonville Terminal decision on the picketing at Moncrief Yard. It is hardly surprising that BLE emphasized the Jacksonville Terminal decision in the state proceedings to dissolve the state injunction, and this reliance is hardly inconsistent with the position that the federal court in 1967 had authoritatively delineated BLE's federally protected right to strike at the Moncrief Yard. England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S.Ct. § 52, are applicable, to the conduct of the defendants here involved. Despite the existence of this longstanding prohibition, in this case a federal court did enjoin the petitioner, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. (ACL), [Footnote 1] from invoking an injunction issued by a Florida state court which prohibited certain picketing by respondent Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers ( BLE). § 151 et seq., and that that right could not be interfered with by state court injunctions. The BLE picketed the yard, encouraging ACL employees not to handle any FEC cars. '7. At no point during the entire argument did either side refer to state law, the effects of that law on the picketing, or the possible preclusion of state remedies as a result of overriding federal law. 90 S.Ct. But if the 1967 order is so understood, it is undeniably clear that the subsequent injunction against the state proceedings was both necessary and appropriate to preserve the integrity of the 1967 order. § 2283. Citation 398 US 281 (1970) Argued. Atlantic Coast L. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. October Term, 1969. Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy. Others have been added by later statutes as well as judicial decisions. The thrust of the District Judge's order is that the procedures prescribed by the Railway Labor Act had been exhausted in relation to the BLE-FEC dispute, that BLE was therefore free to engage in self-help tactics, and that it was properly exercising this federal right when it engaged in the picketing that ACL sought to enjoin. While all the reasons that led Congress to adopt this restriction on federal courts are not wholly clear, [Footnote 3] it is certainly likely that one reason stemmed from the essentially federal nature of our national government. In Galveston Wharves the union fully complied with the pertinent provisions of the Railway Labor Act, but, because the employer had refused to bargain concerning a 'major' dispute, the union was free to strike. Syllabus. App. This conclusion is required because Congress itself set forth the only exceptions to the statute, and those exceptions do not include this situation. 1 Record 509—510. Unquestionably § 2283 manifests a general design on the part of Congress that federal courts not precipitately interfere with the orderly determination of controversies in state proceedings. '4. But whatever doubts we may have are strongly affected by the general prohibition of § 2283. 347 U.S., at 505—506, 74 S.Ct. Legislative policy is here expressed in a clearcut prohibition qualified only by specifically defined exceptions.' Nor do I dispute the Court's holding on the basis of Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 75 S.Ct. MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. App. Cf. The parties to the BLE-FEC 'major dispute,' having exhausted the procedures of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. The state court had interfered with that right, and thus a federal injunction was 'necessary in aid of its jurisdiction.' Achetez neuf ou d'occasion The argument based on protecting the 1967 order is not clearly expressed, but in essence it appears to run as follows: In 1967 the railroad sought a temporary restraining order which the union opposed. 691, 9 L.Ed.2d 759 (1963), in which this Court held that the parties had exhausted all available procedures under the Railway Labor Act and thus were free to resort to self-help. One of the reserved powers was the maintenance of state judicial systems for the decision of legal controversies. Although the union had not been formally served with the complaint and had not filed an answer. Moreover, since the statutory prohibition against such injunctions in part rests on the fundamental constitutional independence of the States and their courts, the exceptions should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction. § 2283. Workers of the Seafarers Int'l Union v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 400 F.2d 320 (C.A. In the course of deciding that request, the United States District Court determined that the union had a federally protected right to picket Moncrief Yard and that this right could not be interfered with by state courts. The Federal District Court ordered the parties to bargain and enjoined the employer from giving effect to, or seeking enforcement of, the state court injunction. The record simply will not support the union's contention on this point. ", 1 Record 249. See the historical discussion of the origin of the 1793 statute in Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. 1109), 22 L.Ed.2d 344 (1969). The injunction of the state court, if allowed to continue in force, would effectively nullify this Court's findings and delineation of rights of the parties. * Before analyzing the specific legal arguments advanced in this case, we think it would be helpful to discuss the background and policy that led Congress to pass the anti-injunction statute in 1793. Workers of the Seafarers Int'l Union v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, supra. After the federal injunction was issued, in proceedings brought by ACL to stay the effectiveness of the order, BLE adhered to its position that the state injunction, if not enjoined, would nullify the District Court's 1967 order delineating the rights of the parties. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Florida East Coast Ry., (Co.), 346 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 2 Record 123; see also id. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. Unlike the Federal District Court, this Court does have potential appellate jurisdiction over federal questions raised in state court proceedings, and that broader jurisdiction allows this Court correspondingly broader authority to issue injunctions 'necessary in aid of its jurisdiction.'. 2d 344 (1969). Such a modification of an earlier order through an opinion in another case is not a "judgment" that can properly be protected by an injunction against state court proceedings. But that is exactly what has occurred in the present case. The explicit wording of § 2283 itself implies as much, and the fundamental principle of a dual system of courts leads inevitably to that conclusion. App. We think the proper interpretation of that somewhat ambiguous passage can be reached only when it is considered in light of the arguments presented to the District Court by the union. We know, from the [Jacksonville Terminal] decision. Both exceptions to the general prohibition of § 2283 imply that some federal injunctive relief may be necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court's consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that case. In any event, the reasons for rejecting the argument with respect to the 1967 order apply equally well to arguments relating to any other orders, cases, or judgments the union has advanced. Decided. Again the argument is somewhat unclear, but it appears to go in this way: The District Court had acquired jurisdiction over the labor controversy in 1967 when the railroad filed its complaint, and it determined at that time that it did have jurisdiction. This case is by no means an easy one. Citation 398 US 281 (1970) Argued. For example, in opposing. This rule applies regardless of whether the federal court itself has jurisdiction over the controversy, or whether it is ousted from jurisdiction for the. But that decision is entirely different from a decision that the Railway Labor Act precludes state regulation of the picketing as well, and this latter decision is an essential prerequisite for upholding the 1969 injunction as necessary 'to protect or effectuate' the 1967 order. Comm., 294 U.S. 698, 55 S.Ct. 1968).' ACL's request for an injunction to halt the picketing was denied by the Federal District Court, which held that the BLE was "free to engage in self-help," and that the Norris-LaGuardia Act and § 20 of the Clayton Act were applicable. See also, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 362 F.2d 649 (C.A. After this suit was instituted ACL merged with the Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. to form the present Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. We will continue, as have the parties, to refer to the petitioner as ACL. 2 Record 105. Although the questions are by no means simple and clear, and the decision is difficult, we conclude that the injunction against the state court was not justified under either. Decided by Case pending. Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring. Pp. and that state law could not be invoked to negate that right. In Capital Service the NLRB sought an injunction against certain picketing under § 10(l) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. However, this policy of nonintervention is by no means absolute, as the explicit exceptions in § 2283 make entirely clear. 226, 17 L.Ed.2d 20) (1966). The first two counts alleged violations of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.